30 blunders which meant Grenfell fire residents never stood a chance

Five experts yesterday highlighted an incredible litany of safety breaches which led to the devastating inferno at Grenfell Tower.

Damning reports published on the first day of formal evidence at the inquiry into the disaster highlighted a catalogue of blunders in refurbishment, maintenance and fire response at the tower block.

Here, the Mail outlines these 30 failings in full:

Inferno: Grenfell Tower in flames last year after a fire started in the tower block in Kensington

1 There is no statutory requirement for central alarm systems in tower blocks because it would conflict with the policy of residents ‘staying put’ in flats.

2 No sprinklers.

3 Firefighters should have directed their hoses on or above the fire, but videos show they were being targeted below.

4 A pipe system to get water up the 24-storey block could not cope and was overloaded – leaving the upper floors, where most people died, vulnerable.

5 Water pipe failure meant fire crews had to pump their own water onto the fire.

6 The failure of the fire lift system delayed firefighters.

7 Advice for residents to stay put in the event of a fire was futile within half an hour of the blaze breaking out – but still slavishly adhered to for another 80 minutes.

8 Combustible cladding panels and insulation systems were ruled ‘substantially to blame’.

9 Two types of cladding and four different insulation layers did not comply with building regulations.

10 Two cavity barriers did not have the required fire performance certificates.

11 The cladding produced toxic smoke that slowed the firefighters as it forced them to wear breathing apparatus.

12 Designers and builders had no idea how the cladding system would perform in a fire as no tests were carried out.

13 Neither the London Fire Brigade nor Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, which was responsible for Grenfell, carried out risk assessments of the cladding.

14 Flammable aluminium panels fixed to the tower and on more than 300 other blocks across England were never subjected to a full British Standard fire test.

15 Stairwell was too narrow and soon became impassable thanks to smoke, darkness, firefighters and distressed and dying victims.

16 An architectural feature called a ‘crown’ at the top of the building caught fire and also helped the blaze spread horizontally.

17 Design of tower blocks is supposed to ‘compartmentalise’ fires into individual flats – but this was not effective at Grenfell.

18 Ventilation system for removing smoke from lobbies failed.

19 Fire stops between each floor were not installed correctly, meaning nothing stopped the blaze leaping up the tower.

20 A ‘culture of non-compliance’ appeared to exist in the maintenance of the tower.

21 Most of the fire doors leading to the 120 flats were relatively new but did not comply with building regulations.

22 Some doors failed within 20 minutes even though they should have blocked fire for an hour.

23 Doors were fitted with a variety of different locks, hinges and letter plates that could significantly reduce fire resistance.

24 Forty-eight doors had glazing that failed and allowed flames and smoke to pass directly through.

25 Fourteen of the doors to Grenfell’s flats were of unknown origin.

26 Some doors designed to ‘self-close’ failed to do so, allowing the fire to spread more quickly.

27 Doors were left open by fire hoses and in one case, a body.

28 Defective windows installed in the 2012-16 refurbishment allowed the fire to spread from a single kitchen to the external cladding through gaps in frames.

29 Windows had no fire-resistant cavity barriers encasing them and these openings were surrounded by combustible material.

30 During refurbishment, the windows were fitted in an ‘improvised manner’ that may have made them less safe.  

Five experts deliver their verdict on blaze that left 72 dead

By Vanessa Allen and Arthur Martin for The Daily Mail

Basic flaws with the cladding at Grenfell Tower and an extraordinary litany of fire safety failings caused the inferno that claimed 72 lives, it was revealed yesterday.

On the first day of formal evidence at the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, a devastating report found the cladding was ‘substantially to blame’ for fuelling a blaze that leapt 19 floors in just 12 minutes.

Its flammable plastic core helped fuel the fire and produced toxic smoke that slowed firefighters, while its design contributed to the ‘catastrophic’ spread of the flames.

What began as a fire in a single apartment at Grenfell Tower quickly spread

What began as a fire in a single apartment at Grenfell Tower quickly spread

How the fire spread: What began as a fire in a single apartment at Grenfell Tower (left) quickly spread (right)

The report was just one of five presented to the inquiry yesterday, outlining an incredible catalogue of failures encompassing virtually every aspect of fire safety at the block in Kensington, west London.

Almost all elements of fire safety at the tower failed – from dangerous fire doors and windows to firefighters who inadvertently helped the flames to spread – leading to a ‘disproportionately high loss of life’.

A fire safety engineer said there was ‘a culture of non-compliance’ at the tower during its £9million refurbishment and its maintenance by a council-appointed body.

The failures allowed the fire to engulf the building at a rate never seen before.

Horrified onlookers watch as the blaze tore through Grenfell Tower. Some can be seen taking pictures at the flames raged

Horrified onlookers watch as the blaze tore through Grenfell Tower. Some can be seen taking pictures at the flames raged

Catastrophic: Grenfell Tower is engulfed in flames as the fire spreads rapidly around the block 

Catastrophic: Grenfell Tower is engulfed in flames as the fire spreads rapidly around the block 

But despite the terrifying speed of the fire’s spread, families in the high rise were told to ‘stay put’ and await rescue in a fire brigade policy that may have cost lives.

Experts told the inquiry the policy had ‘effectively failed’ within 30 minutes of the first 999 call. Despite this, it was not formally abandoned until almost two hours after the blaze broke out.

The public inquiry revealed shocking photographs showing the devastation at Flat 16, where the fire broke out on the fourth floor, and a recording of the first 999 call.

The five expert reports revealed:

  • Cladding installed during the refurbishment contained a flammable plastic that gave the fire a ‘fuel source’
  • It did not comply with building regulations and no full-scale tests had been carried out before it was installed
  • Fire stops between each floor were not installed correctly, meaning nothing prevented the fire jumping between levels
  • Ineffective fire doors failed after just 20 minutes instead of an hour
  • Windows were not fire-resistant, and window frames were surrounded by combustible plastic
  • The building’s only stairwell filled with smoke after ventilation systems failed and doors were blocked open by firefighters’ hoses and – in one case – a dead body
  • Firefighters did not tackle the kitchen fire that sparked the blaze until four minutes after it had spread up the outside cladding
  • Water supply systems in the block, installed for firefighters’ hoses, could not meet demand
  • The ‘stay put’ policy began to fail 21 minutes after the first 999 call, but was kept for two hours.

The inquiry has heard heart-breaking evidence from families who lost relatives in the inferno.

The inquiry’s lead lawyer, Richard Millett QC, said survivors and the bereaved were left with ‘an abiding sense of injustice, betrayal and marginalisation, leading to an overwhelming question: Why?’.

He said the inquiry – the largest of its kind in British legal history – would ‘lay bare the truth’.

He said Grenfell Tower’s refurbishment had ‘created an intolerable fire hazard’ and called the cladding on the outside of the building ‘a catastrophic failure’.

Authorities believed any fire inside would be limited to the flat where it broke out, and were caught out by the ‘unprecedented’ speed and ferocity of the blaze.

Mr Millett made thinly veiled criticisms of the firms and public bodies involved in the tower’s construction, refurbishment and maintenance – all of which have been asked to provide written statements. 

It was owned by Kensington and Chelsea council and run by its tenant management group.

In a statement, London Fire Brigade Commissioner Dany Cotton said: ‘I have never seen a building where the whole of it was on fire. Nobody has ever seen that.

‘It was incredible, it was so alien to anything I have ever seen.’ 

Firefighters arrived six minutes after the first 999 call at 12.54am, but did not enter the kitchen of Flat 16 until 1.14am or begin fighting the fire until 1.20am, by which time it had burned through the new windows’ flammable uPVC frames and lit the exterior cladding.



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