Firefighter overseeing ‘stay-put’ policy at Grenfell tower admits to being ‘out of comfort zone’

A firefighter who led the first response to the Grenfell Tower blaze received no training on evacuating tall buildings with a ‘stay-put’ policy, an inquiry heard today.

Michael Dowden, the watch manager with North Kensington red watch, said he was ‘out of his comfort zone’ and making decisions he had never made before.

He was the first incident commander on the scene when the inferno began on June 14 last year and was in charge of overseeing the ‘stay-put’ policy.

But he did not abandon the controversial advice and order an evacuation or a change of advice to residents who were calling 999 for help. 

Michael Dowden, speaking at the inquiry today, said he was ‘out of his comfort zone’ and making decisions he had never made before

It is feared the controversial policy, which stayed in place for two hours and instructs residents to stay in their flats in the event of a fire, contributed to the death toll.

The fire claimed 72 lives after a blaze started in the kitchen of flat 16 on the fourth floor of the Kensington tower block in West London.

The London Fire Brigade have previously told the official inquiry into the disaster that the advice was suitable for the original design of the tower, but ‘refurbishments over the years’ had ‘undermined the safety of the building.’

 Mr Dowden told the inquiry today that after 20 minutes he could see that ‘something had failed.’

It is feared the controversial 'stay put' policy, which stayed in place for two hours and instructs residents to stay in their flats in the event of a fire, contributed to the death toll

It is feared the controversial ‘stay put’ policy, which stayed in place for two hours and instructs residents to stay in their flats in the event of a fire, contributed to the death toll

He said: ‘After about 20 minutes, I could see that something had failed, to make the fire react as it did. When I saw Grenfell Tower behaving like this, I was quickly outside my comfort zone, and was trying to make decisions that I have not made before.

‘Although I have previous experience in high rise fire fighting, I have never seen a fire behave in this way. 

‘It was totally unprecedented.’ 

Richard Millett QC, counsel to the public inquiry into the blaze, took Mr Dowden through national policy guidance and asked him if he had specific training on certain points.

Mr Dowden said he was not aware of the document’s existence.

One included: ‘Incident commanders should understand when a partial or full evacuation strategy might become necessary in a residential building where a stay-put policy is normally in place.’

Firefighters make their way through debris to get close to the tower as they continued to fight the blaze. The inquiry heard today how watch manager Mr Dowden, who led the initial response had received no training on evacuating tall buildings with a 'stay-put' policy

Firefighters make their way through debris to get close to the tower as they continued to fight the blaze. The inquiry heard today how watch manager Mr Dowden, who led the initial response had received no training on evacuating tall buildings with a ‘stay-put’ policy

Asked if, as an incident commander, he had received such training, Mr Dowden replied after a long pause: ‘As an incident commander I cannot remember any time I have actually been on a training course that would facilitate that.’

Chairman Sir Martin Moore-Bick asked: ‘Did anyone give you any help or advice in understanding when it might be necessary to have a full evacuation, things to look out for, or was it just down to your personal experience?’

He replied: ‘I don’t think I’ve had any input from any individual, the only way I could relate to that is reference back to our internal high-rise policy, particularly around when compartmentation fails etc, but I don’t think I’ve been in a training environment when that’s been referenced.’

A report has found residents should have been told to evacuate within 46 minutes of the fire starting at just before 1am. Instead, they were told to remain in their flats.

By the time those instructions were abandoned at 2.47am it was too late for many to get out.  

Firefighters at the scene hold a one minute silence for the victims five days after the tragedy

Firefighters at the scene hold a one minute silence for the victims five days after the tragedy

A firefighter appears overcome with grief during the minute silence to remember the 72 victims of the blaze

A firefighter appears overcome with grief during the minute silence to remember the 72 victims of the blaze

Mr Millett asked if it would be fair to say that training was ‘a lot about what the policy contained but you weren’t trained in how to implement it’, Mr Dowden replied: ‘I would say that is a fair comment.’

Mr Millett asked the firefighter: ‘Mr Dowden, did you ever receive training on the evacuation of people from the upper floors of high-rise buildings who may have mobility difficulties?’

Mr Dowden responded: ‘Not on the practical application but more theory-based.’

Mr Dowden’s training record was then brought on to the screen, showing several sessions he led on tackling high-rise blazes in previous years.

He was listed as a ‘lecturer’, but said the contents of his lessons were never checked by supervisors or superiors, only auditors who visited occasionally.

Mr Millett asked him: ‘How could you know that the lectures that you were giving to your firefighters about high-rise firefighting were effective?’

He replied: ‘I suppose the only way that I could ever really do that is to see how they apply themselves on the fireground.’

The inquiry lawyer said: ‘Leaving it to the fireground of an actual incident? Might that not be a bit late?’

‘I suppose, yes,’ replied the fire officer.

Many victims of the Grenfell Tower fire were elderly, some with mobility issues, who lived on the top floors of the block.

He added that practical training for tackling fire on high-rise buildings was hard because few such buildings were available to use for practice scenarios.

The watch manager also admitted that he had not received specific training on the early warning signs of a building’s compartmentation failing.

Most high-rise towers are designed so a fire is contained within the flat of origin, which failed to happen at Grenfell Tower.

Mr Dowden said: ‘My only reference to that is in terms of me would be before I was an officer when I was receiving training by officers, referring it back to relevant policy.’

Asked about whether he had received training about how building materials could contribute to fire spread, he said ‘It is difficult to say’, adding that information was often given by responsible persons during visits to the high-rise properties.  



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