The gutted interior of the flat where the Grenfell Tower fire started has been pictured for the first time in reports put before the inquiry into the blaze.
Seventy-two people were killed after the fire tore through the housing block in Kensington, west London, on June 14 last year.
One of a series of expert reports into the disaster released today showed images of flat 16, where the fire started around a fridge freezer.
But the report stopped short of saying a fault with the device was the cause of the blaze, stating only that the ‘origin of the fire was in, or around, the tall fridge freezer’.
This is the kitchen of flat 16, Grenfell Tower, where the fire which claimed 71 lives began last June. A report today found that the fire started ‘in or around’ a fridge freezer in the flat’s kitchen

The report found there were a number of electrical appliances around the fridge which may have sparked the blaze

Officials said the fire started ‘in or around’ the fridge-freezer, but could not be sure whether a fault with the device was the cause of the fire

The fire started in the kitchen of the two-bedroom flat. The kitchen had sliding doors which opened onto the living room, where one of the flat’s occupants lived

The floor of the flat 16’s kitchen was strewn with wreckage of kitchen appliances when investigators got inside. The partition where sliding doors had led to the living room was completely burned away
University of Dundee Professor Niamh Daeid wrote: ‘On the basis of the available evidence, it is more likely than not that the area of origin of the fire was in, or around, the tall fridge freezer in the southeast part of the kitchen.
‘The cause of the fire remains undetermined although, based on the available information, it is more likely than not to be an accidental cause rather than a deliberate act.
‘The originating fire within flat 16 extended out of the kitchen window of the flat and at some point re-entered through the window of the bedroom next to the living room of flat 16 causing further damage to the flat.’
The report states that one of the flat’s three residents, Behailu Kebede, referred to the fridge in his first call to emergency services. He told the call handler: ‘Fire in flat 16, Grenfell Tower… the fridge, flat 16, Grenfell Tower.’
In a witness statement, Mr Kebede said he was woken by a fire alarm around 12:55am.
He went into the kitchen and saw smoke around the fridge-freezer and woke other residents of his flat and surrounding homes.
The report also contains statements from the first and second pairs of firefighters to enter the property.
One of the first pair, Daniel Brown, said he saw an ‘isolated curtain of flame from about two to three feet into the air to the ceiling’.

Three people lived in the flat at the time of blaze. Two women had a bedroom each and a man lived in the living room


A picture taken through the front door of the flat (left) shows limited damage to the entrance hallway. As firefighters moved towards the kitchen however, the fire was much more intense, scorching the hallway leading to the kitchen (right)

Grainy images taken from body cameras worn by firefighters show the moment they opened to door to the kitchen fire
One of the second pair of firefighters, John O’Hanlon, said: ‘The fridge was on the right, quite close to the window. You wouldn’t recognise it as a fridge, just a charred rectangle with a bit of melted stuff at the bottom that was still alight.
‘The window had gone by then, broken. That’s when we noticed the window had completely gone. Even the frame wasn’t there and we noticed that it was on fire, that the window surround was on fire.
‘We walked over to the window and started spraying the window frame. It didn’t have any effect on it, at which point I sat of the window sill and was leaning out trying to hit what I thought was the window surround.’
Five reports have been made available this morning, with others examining the effectiveness of the fire protection measures within the building.
Making his opening remarks at the inquiry today, Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry, said: ‘The fundamental question which lies at the heart of our work is how, in London in 2017, a domestic fire developed so quickly and so catastrophically that an entire high rise block was engulfed, and how it was that 71 people lost their lives in a matter of hours, leaving family and friends in shock, grief and bewilderment.’

The plan show the flat. The fire started in the south-east corner, the bottom right of the image

An estimated picture of the layout of the kitchen shows a number of appliances around the freezer where the blaze started

A plan of the fourth floor shows there were five other flats on that storey of the building. Flat 16 resident Mr Kebede said he woke neigbours after discovering the blaze

After hearing touching testimony from the families of victims of the blaze, the inquiry is now hearing technical details
Grenfell experts condemn ‘total failure’ of stay-put advice saying over an HOUR went by before residents were told to leave via stairs – while fire doors from level 4 to 23 were ‘non-compliant’

‘Stay put’ advice to Grenfell Tower residents from the emergency services that was in place for almost two hours after the fire began was a ‘total failure’ according to an expert witness. Pictured are ambulance teams at the scene of the blaze
The ‘stay put’ advice to those living in Grenfell Tower during the deadly blaze which killed 72 people was a ‘total failure’, according to an expert witness.
Dr Barbara Lane, a chartered fire engineer who works for design consultancy Arup, added it took one hour and 11 minutes between when it became clear the safety advice had failed and when it officially changed to tell residents to leave.
The advice from the emergency services was in place for almost two hours and was repeatedly told to those inside ringing 999 for help.
Dr Lane’s damning report said it was clear the stay put advice had ‘substantially failed’ after just 32 minutes and that it was ‘unclear’ why people were not told to flee the blaze sooner.
She added black smoke had already appeared in the ground floor by this time and had reached the stairwells just 15 minutes later, meaning there was a ‘need for the total evacuation of Grenfell Tower’.
Poorly performing fire doors ‘contributed significantly to the spread of smoke and fire to the lobbies,’ Dr Lane found.
She wrote in her report that this failure ‘would have materially affected the ability or willingness of occupants to escape independently through this space to the stair’.
It would have also hindered the ability of firefighters to rescue many people on the tower’s upper floors.
In 2011, the Tenant Management Organisation – which ran the building – replaced 106 flat entrance fire doors. None of the doors on any of the 120 flats – including the 14 not replaced – were compliant with the fire test evidence relied upon at the time of installation, Dr Lane found.
These shortcomings would have had a number of consequences, including failure to prevent the spread of smoke and flame by leakage through gaps between the door leaf and door frame.
Another failure of an ‘unknown number of doors’ to self-close after an occupant escaped would have allowed ‘immediate’ spread of fire and smoke.

‘Non compliant’ fire doors were also blamed for the spread of the flames while firefighters ‘may have contributed’ by leaving doors open
The lobbies could therefore not be used as a ‘safe air environment’ by the fire service bridgehead, forcing it to remain below level 4 until 7.30am.
‘This greatly reduced the time available using breathing apparatus, and so the time available for rescue on the upper floors, and particularly above Level 15.’

Dr Lane, pictured, is a fire expert for a design consultancy
Firefighters may also have contributed to the spread of fire and smoke into the stairwell by leaving doors ajar as they fought the blaze, Dr Lane found.
She wrote: ‘I have identified the fact that the firefighting operations in response to the multi-storey fire may have contributed to the failure of the stair fire doors to prevent fire and smoke spread.
‘Current evidence indicates some of the stair doors were ajar as firefighting hoses were running from the stair into the lobby. However, I currently do not know the number of doors involved, nor which specific doors, nor for how long this opening may have occurred. I cannot yet conclude whether this made a significant contribution.’
In one case, a fire door to the stairwell was held open by a body, the report said.
The expert’s evidence also blamed the building’s windows for allowing the fire to spread to the combustible cladding, which led to its rapid spread up the tower.
She said the window frames were not protected with fire resistant barriers but instead with ‘combustible materials’ allowing the blaze to expand unchecked.
Another of her conclusions was that key bodies involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower understood how the new cladding system would behave in a fire, a report has said.
In the report Dr Lane said: ‘I have found no evidence yet that any member of the design team or the construction ascertained the fire performance of the rainscreen cladding system materials, nor understood how the assembly performed in fire.
‘I have found no evidence that Building Control were either informed or understood how the assembly would perform in a fire.
‘Further I have found no evidence that the (Tenant Management Organisation) risk assessment recorded the fire performance of the rainscreen cladding system, nor have I found evidence that the LFB risk assessment recorded the fire performance of the rainscreen cladding.’

Pictured: All of the 72 victims of the Grenfell fire disaster and where they lived